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Abstract
Policy makers are increasingly concerned about the combination of market
power and massive data collection in digital markets. This concern is fueled by
the theoretical prediction that more market power causes firms to collect ever more
data from their users. We investigate the relationship between market power and
data collection empirically. We analyze data about more than 1.5 million mobile
applications in several thousand submarkets of Google’s Play Store. We observe
these data for over two years and combine information on an app’s data collec-
tion with information about its competitive environment. Our analysis highlights
a robust positive relationship between market power and data collection. We find
that more data are being collected in concentrated markets, and apps with higher
market shares collect more data. This pattern robustly emerges across a series of
cross-sectional and panel regressions as well as a series of specifications that exploit
exogenous variation.
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1 Introduction
A defining feature of the online market for mobile applications (apps) is that the
services are frequently provided at no monetary cost. Instead, app developers often
request access to the users’ personal data. While this practice may be a welcome bargain
that allows developers to monetize a resource that users are willing to share, it also
raises concerns about the privacy of users as they may often lack knowledge, bargaining
power, and choice. Specifically, app developers’ strategies of collecting personal user data
and sharing it with outside parties in exchange for other services has raised considerable
concern by policy makers and regulators, as is also shown by the recent case of the
German competition authority on Facebook’s data policy claiming an abuse of Facebook’s
dominant position through exploitative business terms by combining different sources of
data without the users’ consent.1 This concern is aggravated by the fact that some
of these services have considerable market power, as in the case of Facebook for the
market of social networks. Arguably, if data is the new currency in the app market, it
is important to understand how competitive pressure (or lack thereof) affects the data
collection practices of developers.
In this paper, we document a robust empirical relationship between market concentra-
tion and intensified collection of private user data in the market for mobile apps. We use
data on more than 1.5 million apps from the Google Play Store that were observed on a
quarterly basis for more than two years until January 2018. The app market is especially
suitable for analyzing the relationship of market concentration and data collection, as it
is characterized by a tremendous potential to collect user data at a low cost. Moreover,
it is possible to observe a large number of submarkets where apps compete with varying
intensity.
For our analysis, we combine data on market concentration in several thousand sub-
markets with information on each app’s data collection. To evaluate market concentra-
tion, we use data on installations and ratings as demand measures, and exploit the Play
Store’s category tree as well as Google’s “similar app” network to determine the sub-
markets, thereby having additionally a more fine-grained market definition than usual.
Measures of data collection are based on the information about an app’s potentially
1See the decision by the German competition authority (last accessed August 28, 2019).
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privacy-intrusive permissions that are requested upon installation from the users. We
augment this data with additional information on app developers’ sharing practices with
third parties.
Using our data, we are the first to document a robust positive correlation between
market concentration and data collection. This pattern emerges consistently across sev-
eral analyses: We first provide a careful descriptive analysis of the prevalence of data
collection and of how market structure varies in the Google Play Store ecosystem. Sec-
ond, we use multivariate regression, fixed effects regressions, and an instrumental variable
approach to study whether more data collection ensues in more concentrated markets.
All of our approaches document a robust positive correlation between market concen-
tration and data collection, the strength of which varies with the chosen specification.
Our descriptive analysis documents that data collection is quite a common phenomenon
among apps and that a considerable share of markets is highly concentrated. We also
document a strong positive raw correlation between market concentration and data col-
lection. Our regression analysis confirms the descriptive findings: Given an app’s market
share, apps in more concentrated environments collect more user data. Moreover, apps
become more aggressive in their data collection when their market share grows.
These results are robust across multiple robustness checks involving alternative mea-
surements of key variables, extending the analysis to data sharing, and testing, whether
the results are sensitive to the choice of the sample, market, and demand. Preliminary
causal analyses confirm the main finding, both when using indicators of the existence and
strength of network effects as an instrument for the app’s competitive environment and
when exploiting a recategorization as a natural experiment similar to Ershov (2018). A
first exploration of the underlying mechanism showed the relationship to be more pro-
nounced in markets that depend on data as a currency or are economically more relevant.
Our paper contributes to the scientific and public debate in several ways. First,
we provide the first large-scale empirical evidence on the positive relationship between
market concentration and data collection. Our evidence is based on data from a highly
relevant market and we provide novel measures for key variables, a large set of robustness
checks, and implement several novel attempts to identify causal effects. Second, from
a managerial perspective, the paper provides empirical evidence that aims at a better
understanding on the role of data for the success of a business. Finally, our main finding
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documents a robust positive correlation of varying strength. This result informs the
ongoing policy debate about privacy and competition between antitrust authorities, policy
makers and the public.
2 Related literature
A strand of literature, which is closely related to our work, specifically studies the
relationship between a firm’s access to (user) data and its competitive environment.
The corresponding theoretical work mostly presumes that more market power comes on
average with more data collection by companies (Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane,
2015; Dimakopoulos and Sudaric, 2018). In this line of research, data is assumed to be
valuable for firms, be it for targeted advertisement, the implementation of user-specific
pricing, or as a direct possibility for revenue generation by selling the data to third parties.
At the same time, if firms collect data about users and users realize this, it reduces the
product’s quality from the perspective of the users by being detrimental to their privacy
(see, e.g., Kummer and Schulte, 2019). This can be more broadly related to the quality
provision in oligopoly, as products can be provided with inferior quality because of the
firm’s market power (Tirole, 1988).
Campbell et al. (2015) study data collection in the context of competition and how
this is affected by a regulation to protect privacy. They show that an opt-in regulation,
where users have a fixed cost of giving their consent, might create a barrier to entry for
small and new firms, especially if they cater for the needs of fewer customers. In this
respect, an increasing amount of articles look at the impact of the European General
Data Protection Regulation or GDPR (Goldberg et al., 2019; Jia et al., 2019). However,
these studies have not considered effects on the competitive environment.
Empirical evidence on the relationship between data collection and market structure
is scarce. Preibusch and Bonneau (2013) use descriptive evidence for 140 websites from
five Internet industries and find that websites having no major competitor collect signif-
icantly more data than those having competitors. Sabatino and Sapi (2019) study the
2009 ePrivacy Directive, a regulation strengthening users’ privacy, and its impact on the
revenue and profits of European e-commerce firms. They find evidence for a negative
impact on large firms, but none on small firms.
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To the best of our knowledge, there are no other quantitative studies providing ev-
idence on how the firm’s market power is related to its data collection behaviour. Our
contribution is to provide the first large-scale empirical evidence on this relationship in
a very relevant and topical online market including novel measures for both privacy and
competition. Based on the existing literature, we follow the main hypothesis that more
market power comes with more data collected by firms.
Another aim of this paper is to contribute to research analyzing the economics of
privacy reviewed by Acquisti et al. (2016) and Brown (2016). In this literature strand,
theoretical models conceptualize privacy in online markets mostly as firms using (past)
information on individuals to tailor prices or advertising (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2019).
A common example of such private data on individuals comprises cookies that enable
tracking users and their past behavior online, thereby facilitating targeted advertisements.
Several empirical studies look at the effect of restricting the use of these cookies and
consider, for example, the resulting effects on exchange prices or revenues by publishers.
Their estimates range from a loss of 4 percent to 65 percent in the respective value
(Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011; Johnson et al., 2019; Marotta et al., 2019). The industry
estimates are much closer to the upper end, where the latest study by Google is based
on a random control trial that involves disabling cookies for randomly selected users and
resulting in an average loss of revenue by 52 percent of publishers.2
Similarly, several articles look at restricting the use of private data through the lens
of privacy policies (Aziz and Telang, 2015; Johnson, 2013; Tucker, 2012, 2014). They find
a decrease in revenues due to targeted ads being less successful, yet, also emphasising
possible benefits for users. On a related note, some studies analyse the presence of
economic returns to data with ambiguous evidence (Bajari et al., 2019; Chiou and Tucker,
2017; Claussen et al., 2019; Schaefer et al., 2018).
Finally, a few selected papers analyze the role of privacy, specifically, in app markets.
The existing empirical research on this topic is mostly based on experimental and survey
data, which is rather focused on the demand side (see, e.g., Egelman et al., 2013; Savage
and Waldman, 2015). An exception is the study by Kummer and Schulte (2019), who
exploit observational app data and analyze additionally the supply side by, for example,
distinguishing free and paid apps. However, competition aspects are not within the scope
2See the paper by Google (last accessed August 28, 2019).
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of that article.
Overall, these studies confirm the value of private data for both sides of the market.
However, none of these papers have analyzed the role of the competitive environment for
the firm’s decision to collect data and we propose to fill this gap.
3 Background: App industry
The launch of the iPhone by Apple in 2007 marks the reinvention of the phone
accompanied with the slogan to be only the beginning and shortly followed by the
first phone based on the Android operating system from Google. Merely twelve years
after, in the beginning of 2019, Google has 2.5 billion active mobile devices running
with its operating system, while Apple has 1.4 billion.3 In both cases, touch-based
smartphones make up the vast majority. This widespread adoption can be explained
by the personalization of software facilitated by applications or apps that go beyond
traditional functionalities of feature or basic phones. Google and Apple make up the
market for mobile operation systems, where Google comprises a share of 85 percent
and Apple with close to 15 percent most of the remainder.4 Through their respective
stores, the Google Play Store (formerly Android Market) and the Apple App Store, the
two platforms provide primarily apps with consumers spending a total of 101 billion US
dollars worldwide in 2018.5 While Apple makes more money from its store, Google has
distinctively more apps available with close to 2.6 million in April of 2019, coming from a
peak of 3.5 million in 2018 concluding a massive growth phase.6 This also illustrates the
dynamic character of the industry with an extraordinary amount of entry and exit that
creates considerable variation in the competitive environment. The Google Play Store
mainly consists of apps that are divided into more than 40 subcategories (including 17
for games), which themselves cover several thousands of markets as we will show.
Money in the market for mobile applications can be directly made by having paid
apps or enabling in-app purchases. While the former only makes up a small fraction with
around five percent of the total amount of apps, the possibility for the latter has been
3See the reports for Google and Apple (last accessed August 28, 2019).
4See, for more details, IDC’s device market trends (last accessed August 28, 2019).
5See the State of Mobile 2019 by App Annie (last accessed August 28, 2019).
6See, for more details, the general statistics by AppBrain (last accessed August 28, 2019).
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only introduced in 2012 and is now prevalent among double the amount of paid apps.7
Besides this, other monetization options – in the classical sense – comprise subscriptions,
rewarded products, and e-commerce, but are rather negligible.
More importantly, as in other online markets, apps are mostly for free. Instead, users
give access to data and are exposed to advertising, the latter constituting a major revenue
channel of app developers as the collected data can help to serve targeted advertisements.
However, this is mostly limited to larger app developers, as a certain size is necessary
both to cover the costs in order to sell the respective information as well as to attract
advertisers. In the case of smaller developers, third parties often act as an intermediary
by exchanging data for targeted ads between multiple developers and advertisers. How-
ever, third parties do not only enable this kind of access, but can also provide valuable
services and functionality in exchange for user data. Finally, data from users can also
be directly exchanged for money. In this respect, Christl and Spiekermann (2016) give
a brief overview of the data sharing behavior by apps and the accompanied data broker
industry.
4 Empirical framework
If user data is valuable to developers and users, as outlined above, the user data
that developers collect resemble a non-monetary price. Building on this evidence, we
want to analyze whether it is positively associated with firms’ market power and market
concentration. Hence, we model the amount of data collected per user as a function
of various proxies of apps’ market power and test this relationship empirically. In this
section, we describe our main dataset, the main variables of interest, provide descriptive
evidence, and describe our econometric approach.
4.1 Data
To address our research questions, we use data from the Google Play Store and App-
Brain to compile a unique and innovative database, which contains quarterly product-level
information for the period from 2015 to 2018 on nearly all apps available in Google’s Play
Store (up to 2.5 million apps per wave). We retrieve this data by means of web-scraping
7See the statistics by AppBrain on paid apps and for apps with in-app billing (last accessed August
28, 2019).
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the complete Play Store content page of each app as described in Figure 6.
The data contains detailed information about the apps, their developers, and competi-
tors.8 In the following, we will mostly rely on two datasets consisting of a cross section
from October 2017 and a quarterly panel ranging from October 2015 to January 2018.9
User data: We leverage the unique feature that the Google Play Store displays all
the permissions requested by an app, thereby giving us an indication about the extent
to which an app has access to user data. The amount and variety of information that
developers can collect about the users through their app depends very much on each
single permission the app requests upon installation from the user. In total, develop-
ers can choose among over 200 different permissions. 10 However, only some of these
permissions allow to specifically collect information about users’ behaviour as well as
preferences and can therefore be considered privacy-sensitive and of particular interest
for our study. Following Kummer and Schulte (2019), we employ a definition consisting
of 25 privacy-sensitive permissions. As a result, our main variable corresponds to the
number of such permissions requested by an app (#DataCollection). In addition, we cre-
ate a dummy variable which is equal to one if an app has at least one privacy-sensitive
permission (DDataCollection).
Finally, we assess the sensitivity of these measures by also employing a category-
specific definition of privacy-sensitiveness accounting for permissions of apps that are
necessary for their functionality and an indicator if an app uses intrusive software libraries
by third parties (taken from AppBrain).11 We define the former as the number of privacy-
sensitive permissions minus the permissions needed for functionality, thereby following
the rationale that, for example, a navigation app necessitates a permission to access
the location. In order to classify permissions needed for functionality, we look at the
permissions used by paid apps in the categories as the benchmark, which rely less likely
on data. If the share of paid apps in the category using this permission is above the
8For a description of the variables available in the raw data, see Appendix A.1.2.
9Some apps drop out of our sample due to missing values in key variables. Additionally, clusters of
one app are dropped and apps have to be observed in the last three waves as well as at least two times
in total. However, all competition variables are computed before these drops.
10See Google’s documentation (last accessed August 28, 2019).
11Third-party libraries are software components typically easing access to services or adding function-
ality, which are provided by an entity other than the developer. See AppBrain for an exemplary overview
(last accessed August 28, 2019).
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overall average for paid apps in the Google Play Store regarding this permission, then it
is a category-specific permission, which is to be subtracted. We define intrusive software
libraries as sharing data with outside parties in exchange for services such as the access
to ad networks, social media, or app analytics, which can be considered privacy-intrusive
as well.12
Market power: To measure apps’ market power, we make use of two standard mea-
sures being market concentration and market shares. We exploit a distinctive feature
of our dataset which is the availability of information on app-specific competitors. The
Google Play Store provides information on a set of ‘similar apps’ for each app, which
are selected according to their similarity in functionality.13 For each app between 0 and
49 of such competitors are displayed in the Play Store.14 Based on this information, we
define for each app the relevant market as well as its relevant set of competitors in the
following:
First, we assume that the relevant market consists of the set of similar apps from its
own category, i.e., dating apps are assumed to compete only with other dating apps but
not with weather or wallpaper apps. Second, we define markets by constructing a network
based on the information about similar apps. In this network, each app represents a node
and an edge (or link) between two apps is established if one app is listed as a similar apps
of another one. For building the network, information from all waves on similar apps
is used and the link is weighted by the occurrence across quarters such that frequent
similar apps are taken into account more strongly. Using network analysis, we are then
able to detect clusters of apps (or ‘isolated app communities’) that represent market
segments, which we assume to be the same across the waves.15 An exemplary cluster
comprising apps related to virtual private networks is displayed in Figure 7. We consider
12Intrusive libraries are classified by tags (‘Ad networks,’ ‘Social,’ and ‘Analytics’) provided on App-
Brain and by going manually through the description pages of all development libraries on AppBrain.
13Although Google does not disclose the criteria, we infer this from shared experiences by developers
(see, for instance, an exemplary thread on Quora, last accessed August 28, 2019).
14The maximum number of similar apps displayed in the Google Play Store changed over time: Until
December 2016 there was a limit of 24 similar apps, whereas afterwards this has increased to 49. Addi-
tionally, the actual set of apps is in many cases even bigger such that Google varies the subset of similar
apps shown.
15We use the R package igraph and try several cluster detection algorithms such as fastgreedy, mul-
tilevel, and walktrap. For the moment, we use the multilevel algorithm (Bliese, 2006) in our analyses,
because of the moderate computational effort and the resulting clusters that have been validated by
manually going through some of the clusters.
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this market definition as an improvement compared to common industry-level definitions
as it describes more likely the relevant choice set (and market) by consumers as opposed
to a heterogeneous category encompassing ten thousands of apps. In order to show this,
we compare the results when employing different aggregation levels.
Having defined for each app the relevant market and its set of competitors, we can
construct variables which proxy apps’ market power. A first measure of app demand is
the number of ratings (Ratings). Following Kummer and Schulte (2019), we have the
number of ratings as our demand variable of interest as it is continuous in contrast to
the number of installations, which is divided into discrete intervals ranging from only 0-5
to 5-10 billion and resulting in little variation from quarter to quarter especially with
increasing amount of installations. As an alternative, we use the predicted number of
installations (Pred. Installs).16 Both proxies measure the number of customers who
consider the benefits of installing an app greater than the associated loss of privacy. The
two demand measures are highly correlated (see, for more details, Kummer and Schulte,
2019).17
Combining the information on the relevant sets of competitors of an app and an
app’s demand, we then construct market shares (Market Share) as well as the market
concentration by a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Both are standard measures of
market power and typically assumed to be positively correlated with a firms’ ability to
raise prices above marginal cost (corresponding to a mark-up).
Control variables: In order to explain apps requesting privacy-sensitive permissions,
we employ various app-specific and developer-specific measures as covariates based on
previous research (see Kummer and Schulte, 2019). These variables approximate the
monetization strategy (presence of an app price, in-app product price, and advertise-
ment), the disclosure of processing personal information (presence of a privacy policy),
the functionality (number of “clean”, i.e., remaining permissions), quality (average rat-
ing), and general characteristics (description length, content rating, age, and category).
Additionally, the number of apps by the developer is accounted for.
16The prediction exploits the relationship between the number of ratings and the number of installa-
tions, when an app passes an installation step.
17The high correlation is not surprising given that users have to install an app in order to rate it.
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4.2 Descriptive evidence
Before turning to the main analysis, we first provide descriptive evidence. Table 1
shows the summary statistics of the main variables of interest for both the cross section
from October 2017 and for the panel.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Cross Section Panel
Mean P50 Min Max Count Mean P50 Min Max Count
DDataCollection 0.52 1.00 0 1 1,336,625 0.53 1.00 0 1 11,477,730
#DataCollection 1.33 1.00 0 16 1,336,625 1.36 1.00 0 16 11,477,730
HHI (Ratings) 0.15 0.08 0 1 1,336,625 0.13 0.07 0 1 11,477,730
HHI (Pred. Installs) 0.17 0.10 0 1 1,336,625 0.15 0.08 0 1 11,477,730
Market Share (Ratings) 0.02 0.00 0 1 1,336,625 0.02 0.00 0 1 11,477,730
Market Share (Pred. Installs) 0.02 0.00 0 1 1,336,625 0.02 0.00 0 1 11,477,730
Log. Ratings 2.90 2.48 0 17 1,336,625 3.00 2.56 0 18 11,477,730
DPaid 0.07 0.00 0 1 1,336,625 0.07 0.00 0 1 11,477,730
#CleanPerms. 5.22 5.00 0 174 1,336,625 5.17 5.00 0 182 11,477,730
DInAppProduct 0.09 0.00 0 1 1,336,625 0.09 0.00 0 1 11,477,730
Avg. Rating 4.03 4.10 1 5 1,336,625 4.07 4.20 0 5 11,477,730
Length Description 1,065.01 730.00 1 11,684 1,336,625 1,048.42 727.00 1 11,697 11,477,730
DIncludesAds 0.51 1.00 0 1 1,336,625 0.25 0.00 0 1 11,477,730
Content Rating 4.98 5.00 1 6 1,336,625 5.51 5.00 1 10 11,477,730
DPrivacyProfile 0.36 0.00 0 1 1,336,625 0.27 0.00 0 1 11,477,730
#AppsbyDeveloper 89.63 8.00 1 4,690 1,336,625 77.61 8.00 1 5,171 11,477,730
App Age 1,073.48 982.00 -15 3,334 1,336,625 1,163.38 1,069.00 -15 3,334 11,477,730
#Libraries 4.69 3.00 0 51 333,613 4.68 3.00 0 53 2,036,135
#IntrusiveLibraries 1.65 1.00 0 36 333,613 1.65 1.00 0 37 2,036,135
DIntrusiveLibraries 0.67 1.00 0 1 333,613 0.67 1.00 0 1 2,036,135
4.2.1 Collection of user data
The summary statistics show that data collection is quite a common phenomenon
among apps. We observe that close to 50 percent of all apps are able to collect data
through privacy-sensitive permissions. The left panel of Figure 1 in addition illustrates
the distribution for the number of problematic permissions apps have access to and shows
that around 20 percent of all apps have three or more of such permissions. On the other
hand, about two thirds of apps use intrusive software libraries by third parties with an
overall average of close to two of such libraries, while the average amount of libraries in
general is close to five.18 The right panel of Figure 1, displaying the distribution for the
number of intrusive libraries, shows that 46 percent use only one or two, while the share
falls rather quickly with only four percent of apps having six libraries or more.
18Note that, due to rate limiting, the information from AppBrain is only available for a subsample.
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Figure 1: User data measures
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Notes: Based on the cross section from October 2017, the figures show histograms for two
measures of data collection: Panel (a) shows the distribution of the number of problematic
permissions of an app. Panel (b) shows the distribution of number of intrusive software
libraries.
Underlying these average values, as Figure 8 in the Appendix illustrates, there is
considerable cross-category heterogeneity. In some app categories such as Travel & Local,
Maps & Navigation, Dating, and Communication around 80 percent of all apps have at
least one permission which allows them to access private user data, whereas for example
in Board, Personalization, as well as Art & Design less than 30 percent of apps have
such permissions. Similarly, intrusive software libraries are most prevalent among apps
in game categories and Dating with shares above 80 percent, while less than a quarter of
apps in the category Libraries & Demo have such a library (figures not reported).
4.2.2 Competition in the market for mobile apps
Regarding competition, we document an especially high degree of heterogeneity among
the various markets in the mobile app industry (see Figure 2 for histograms of the key
variables). For example, the number of competitors within markets ranges from 2 to
way above 1000 in single cases of our cluster-based market definition. Similarly, there is
considerable heterogeneity in market concentration ratios, with the HHI ranging from zero
to one.19 Accordingly, we find for a considerable share of markets a high concentration
ratio of above 0.5 (ten percent, when looking at all clusters with more than four apps,
and four percent, when looking at clusters larger than ten apps). The average app is
active in a market with an HHI equal to 0.15 (averaged across clusters). Additionally,
19Note that we compute the HHI on a range between 0 and 1, rather than using the definition that
ranges from 0 to 10,000.
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within markets, apps have very different market shares: the average app has a market
share of two percent, however, the median app has a market share of below one percent
indicating the long tail towards higher market shares. Similarly, there is considerable
heterogeneity across categories (see Figure 9). Accordingly, the market concentration is
higher for clusters in game categories and Communication, whereas it is lower in clusters
of categories for Weather and Art & Design, which resonates well with the presence of
network effects.
4.2.3 Relationship between data collection and competition
Figures 3 and 4 visualize the relationship between market power and data collection
in our data. Figure 3 contains three bar panels which show how the HHI is related to
various measures of permissions. For example, panel (a) shows that apps active in highly
concentrated markets (HHI > 0.75 ) request on average around 15 percent more privacy-
sensitive permissions than the overall average app, whereas in less concentrated markets
(HHI < 0.1 ) apps request 2.5 percent less problematic permissions than the overall av-
erage app. The figure highlights the positive cross-sectional correlation between market
concentration and apps’ number of problematic permissions. In contrast, panel (b) illus-
trates the same relationship for unproblematic permissions, which is comparably weak,
i.e., there is no clear positive or negative relationship between the HHI and the number
of clean permissions and the effect sizes are also comparably small. Not surprisingly,
panel (c), which shows the relationship between market concentration and the share of
problematic permissions in total permissions, suggests that also the share of problematic
permissions is strongly and positively correlated with the market concentration. Taken
together, the figures above show a positive raw correlation between market concentration
and the access to more sensitive permissions by apps. In contrast, we found no such
relationship for functionality-relevant permissions, which do not allow collecting sensitive
user data. The size of this surface correlation would imply a “data mark-up” of almost
20 percent (comparing markets having a very small HHI with a very high HHI).
Analogously, in Figure 4 we illustrate the relationship between apps’ market share
and the requested permissions. Panel (a), for example shows that apps with a very small
market share (Market Share < 0.01 ) request on average 2.5 percent less problematic
permissions, whereas apps with a very large market share (Market Share > 0.3 ) request
12
Figure 2: Competition measures
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Notes: Based on the cross section from October 2017, the figures show histograms for
three competition measures. Panel (a) and (b) show the distribution of the number of
apps in a cluster, both on app-level and cluster-level. Panel (c) and (d) show the distri-
bution of the HHI, and panel (e) and (f) show the distribution of the logarithmic market
share, distinguished by the two demand definitions (ratings and predicted installations),
respectively.
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Figure 3: Market concentration intervals and permissions
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Notes: Based on the cross section from October 2017 and the number of ratings as the demand,
the figures show bar graphs for the relationship between HHI and three measures of permissions.
The figures show how the average value in each HHI interval deviates (in percent) from the overall
average value of the respective permission measure. Panel (a) shows it for the number of problematic
permissions, panel (b) shows it for the number of unproblematic (clean) permissions, and panel (c)
shows it for the share of problematic permissions in total permissions.
Figure 4: Market share intervals and permissions
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Notes: Based on the cross section from October 2017 and the number of ratings as the demand, the
figures show bar graphs for the relationship between market shares and three measures of permissions.
The figures show how the average value in each market share interval deviates (in percent) from the
overall average value of the respective permission measure. Panel (a) shows it for the number of
problematic permissions, panel (b) shows it for the number of unproblematic (clean) permissions,
and panel (c) shows it for the share of problematic permissions in total permissions.
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on average around 25 percent more permissions than the overall average app. Thus,
similarly, for the market share there is a strong and positive relationship with apps’
ability to collect user data. However, in contrast to the relationship between the HHI
and requested permissions, for the market share, we find a positive relationship with
clean permissions in panel (b). However, its size is small compared to the one with
problematic permissions (apps with a very high market share just request less than 10
percent more clean permissions than the average app). This positive relationship for
unproblematic is not surprising and might be explained through apps’ functionality, which
should be positively correlated with both their market share and number of unproblematic
permissions. Similarly, panel (c) confirms that the share of problematic permissions
in total permissions is also positively related to the app’s market share. Thus, these
figures illustrate that the market share of an app comes also with a more intensive use of
problematic permissions and thus the ability to collect more information about users.
The descriptive results for both the market concentration and market share suggest
a rather monotonic behavior, but, of course, can only give an indication, as we do not
control for anything further, which is to be outlined in the following.
4.3 Econometric specification
4.3.1 Correlational analysis
In a first step, we estimate the following baseline model for our cross section of apps
(from October 2017):
(1) Datai = α + β1MPi + γDemandi + θXi + i,
where Datai is the amount of data collected per user by app i and is measured by the
number of problematic permissions an app requests upon installation. Market power
(MPi) is measured via: (1) market concentration using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) and (2) the logarithmic market share (Log. Market Share).20 A positive value
for our coefficient of interest, β, would indicate that a more concentrated market is related
on average with more problematic permissions per app and user. We control for apps’
own demand (Demandi), which is proxied by the (log) number of ratings an app has
20The logarithmic market share is chosen to reduce right skewness. In a robustness check, we turn to
market shares.
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received, as well as for a set of explanatory variables relevant for data collection outlined
before (Xi).
4.3.2 Analysis with Panel Fixed Effects
In a second step, to control for time-invariant unobserved factors, which could drive
the cross-sectional relationship between data collection and market power, we use our
panel, which covers the period from October 2015 to January 2018 and apply a panel
fixed effects approach. Hence, we extend our baseline specification by including an app
fixed effect (αi):
(2) Datait = αi + β1MPit + γDemandit + θXit + it,
where t represents a quarter. In particular, unmeasured quality and functionality of apps
could be positively correlated with both the use of permissions (which can come with
additional functionality) and especially a higher market share, which, if not controlled
for, would result in an upward bias.
4.3.3 Endogeneity
Motivation: Although the previous methods can control for time-invariant unobserved
and various time-variant observed factors, we note that it cannot account for all sources
of bias. The remaining sources of endogeneity might provide biased estimation results
for the true effect of market power on apps’ data collection behavior: First, unobserved
factors such as managerial quality or quality of the app’s business plan might drive both
the strategy for data collection and the app’s quality (and the resulting market share).
Second, data collection could also drive market shares as well as market concentration,
and induce reverse causality that stands in the way of identifying the causal effect of
interest. Third, our measures of market power come with considerable noise and mea-
surement error, which will induce a classical attenuation bias. Unobserved heterogeneity
and reverse causality could induce a positive bias for the estimated coefficients of both
market share and market concentration. This concern is somewhat mitigated in our panel
analysis, which accounts for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, the bias
for market concentration could be reduced because we control for market share. In con-
trast, a measurement error will bias our estimates towards zero, which counteracts the
aforementioned upward biases.
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Exploiting exogenous variation: To identify the effect of market power on data
collection causally, we first utilize a recategorization of apps in the Google Play Store as
a ‘natural experiment.’ In early September 2016, Google added eight new app categories.21
These new categories include Art & Design, Auto & Vehicles, Beauty, Dating, Events,
Food & Drink, House & Home, and Parenting.22
As a result, consumer search improved as the discoverability of apps that moved
into these new, and rather niche, categories increased compared to before, when they
were together with distinct app types in a much broader category. This is supported by
surveys showing that the majority of consumers find new apps through the store, either
by searching specifically or browsing through categories.23 Figure 5 shows a screenshot
of the category tree before and after the recategorization.
Figure 5: Category tree before and after the recategorization
Accordingly, we expect that competition intensified for apps in these new categories.
This rationale is in line with Ershov (2018), who exploits a past recategorization of apps in
game categories and finds also an increased app entry. More importantly, the announce-
ment and the accompanied changes were not anticipated by market participants.24 In
addition, to the best of our knowledge, there was no other major policy change in the
Google Play Store at the time.
We consider apps that moved into new categories as the treatment group and exclude
game categories in the analysis (as they are less comparable). Admittedly, apps in existing
21See Google’s announcement (last accessed August 28, 2019).
22In addition, the categories Transportation and Media & Video were renamed to Maps & Navigation
and Video Players & Editors, respectively. A comparison of the categories before and after is given in
Table 3.
23See Ershov (2018) or, for instance, Apple’s statistics on search to find apps (last accessed August
28, 2019).
24Google claims to improve the overall search experience, while providing no particular selection cri-
teria.
17
categories, where apps are moved away from are to some degree treated as well. However,
as can be seen in Table 3, the apps moving away make up only a negligible fraction of the
old categories. The table also shows, in which categories apps were before the change.25
We will denote these control groups as “OLD,” while we have another control group
denoted by “NOT” that are apps in the remaining categories. Additionally, we run
several robustness checks to analyse the sensitivity.
As an alternative approach, we utilize the exogenous variation in the intensity of
network effects in an instrumental variable framework in Subsection A.3.
5 Estimation results
In the following subsection, we present our main finding: In more concentrated mar-
kets, there is an increased data collection, while apps having a higher market share also
collect more data. Subsequently, we test the robustness of this finding in Subsection
5.2, which is followed by an analysis of the mechanisms that drive our main finding
(Subsection 5.3).
5.1 Main result
Table 2 shows our cross-sectional and panel fixed effects analysis of the relationship be-
tween market concentration and data collection. The dependent variable in these regres-
sions is the number of privacy-sensitive permissions that an app collects (#DataCollection),
and we show the main result for the cross section (columns 1, 2, 5, and 6), and the
full panel (columns 3, 4, 7, and 8).26 We use two alternative demand definitions: The
first definition (denoted by 1) uses the number of ratings to compute market shares and
concentration. For the second definition, we predict the number of installations before
computing market shares and market concentration (denoted by 2). Columns 1-4 focus
on market concentration only, while columns 5-8 include also the app’s market share in
the specification, and the main coefficients of interest are HHI and Log. Market Share.
The results show that market concentration is positively related to data collection
across all different specifications. While the relationship is stronger in the cross section,
the coefficients are smaller but remain robust in the panel. The effect prevails when
25See Google’s respective help page (last accessed August 28, 2019).
26A count data analysis yields qualitatively similar results. For simplification, we only show OLS
results.
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controlling for market share, even though market share itself is also positively related
to data collection, which suggests, that the main effects may be driven by apps that
gain increasing shares of the market. The number of new ratings is negatively related to
data collection, which could suggest that apps collecting substantial amount of data are
not as highly demanded as apps which do not request such data (in line with findings
from Kummer and Schulte, 2019). Note that all these specifications control, among other
things, for price, functionality (measured by the number of unproblematic permissions
#CleanPerms.), app age, and quality (using our proxies that measure average rating and
the length of the app’s description). Taken together, we find a robust pattern: Apps
in highly concentrated markets (HHI > 0.8 ) collect around 1-2 percent more data than
apps in competitive markets (HHI < 0.1 ). In addition, players with a higher market
share within a market collect more user data. We note that the estimated relationships
in this specification are relatively small, but point out that the panel results might be
biased towards zero because of attenuation bias.
5.2 Robustness
In this section, we analyze the robustness of our results. First, we show that our results
neither critically depend on how we measure our dependent variable (data collection),
nor on how we quantify our variables of interest (competition). Second, we show that our
results extend to sharing the data with outside parties that offer developers functionalities
and services through libraries in exchange. Third, we consider different sample, market,
and demand definitions in order to rule out that the results are driven by our preferred
choice. Finally, different ways to exploit exogenous variation are employed.
5.2.1 Employing alternative measures
Table 4 analyzes the relationship, when using alternative measures of data collection.
As before, we show cross-sectional and panel regressions for both demand definitions.
The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one,
if an app requests any privacy-sensitive permissions (DDataCollection), and in columns 5-8,
we use context-specific criteria based on the app categories to determine, which privacy-
sensitive permissions are not necessarily functional (#Category−SpecificDataCollection). The
effects remain robust, even when we use the category-specific measure, which accounts
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Table 2: Baseline estimations
#DataCollection
CS1 CS2 Panel1 Panel2 CS1 CS2 Panel1 Panel2
HHI 0.141*** 0.126*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.009*** 0.008***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. Market Share 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log. Ratings -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.078*** -0.079*** -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DPaid -0.334*** -0.334*** 0.028*** 0.028*** -0.330*** -0.330*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009)
#CleanPerms. 0.312*** 0.312*** 0.267*** 0.267*** 0.312*** 0.312*** 0.267*** 0.267***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
DInAppProduct -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.025*** -0.025***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Avg. Rating 0.001 0.001 -0.008*** -0.008*** 0.000 0.000 -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. Length Description -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
DIncludesAds -0.324*** -0.325*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.321*** -0.321*** -0.046*** -0.046***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Content Rating 0.015*** 0.015*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.013*** 0.013*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DPrivacyProfile 0.372*** 0.372*** -0.037*** -0.037*** 0.373*** 0.373*** -0.037*** -0.037***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
#AppsbyDeveloper -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
App Age 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (.) (.) (0.000) (0.000) (.) (.)
Constant -0.382*** -0.382*** 0.250*** 0.250*** -0.211*** -0.211*** 0.268*** 0.267***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020)
Category Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Wave No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Mean #DataCollection 1.325 1.325 1.356 1.356 1.325 1.325 1.356 1.356
Observations 1,336,625 1,336,625 11,477,730 11,477,730 1,336,625 1,336,625 11,477,730 11,477,730
Num. of Groups 1,705,215 1,705,215 1,705,215 1,705,215
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.52 0.28 0.28 0.52 0.52 0.28 0.28
Notes: The table shows cross-sectional and panel fixed effects regressions, with the dependent variable being the number of
privacy-sensitive permissions that an app collects # DataCollection. The coefficients of interest are HHI and Log. Market
Share. Columns 1-4 focus on market concentration only, while columns 5-8 include the app’s market share in the specification.
Odd columns (1, 3, 5, and 7) use our ratings demand definition to compute market shares and concentration, while even
columns (2, 4, 6, and 8) predict the number of installations as the demand before computing market shares and market
concentration. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01.
for app-specific permission needs and negates one purpose of data collection being func-
tionality. This strengthens our result that data is a currency in this market.
In Table 5, we employ alternative competition measures. The first two columns show
how concentrated (HHI = 0.3-0.6 ) and highly concentrated (HHI = 0.6-1.0 ) markets
compare to less concentrated markets (HHI < 0.3 ). In columns 3 and 4, we examine
the number of competitors in the market (#NumberofCompetitors in hundreds), whereas in
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columns 5 and 6 our concentration measure is the Market Share of the Top 4. Similarly,
we show cross-sectional and panel regressions, however, only for the demand definition
based on the number of ratings.
The results in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 indicate a positive relationship between market
concentration and data collection as before. Column 4, in contrast shows a negative
relationship between the number of competitors and data collection, which is in line with
the idea that less competitive markets (where less competitors are active) see higher rates
of data collection. The positive correlation in the cross section might be driven by the
heterogeneity between the apps. The results thus also highlight that the effect is not
only driven by firms with larger market shares, but also by the number of competitors.
However, a dummy variable indicating the market leader as an explanatory variable is
also positively and significantly related with data collection (tables not reported). Finally,
it is worth noting that the size of the effects on average data collection remains relatively
small.
5.2.2 Sharing data with third parties
Table 6 shows the relationship between competition (or lack thereof) and data sharing
as measured by the existence of intrusive software libraries within apps. We show cross-
sectional estimates, where the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if
an app uses at least one intrusive software library (DIntrusiveLibrary).27 This dependent
variable is based on our augmented data about developers’ use of third-party libraries.
Using these libraries implies sharing the collected data with outside parties and thus sheds
light on data usage rather than collection. Our analysis shows a positive relationship,
and thus reinforces the findings on data collection from before. Data sharing is more
common in concentrated markets and apps with a stronger position are more likely to
share their data.
5.2.3 Varying the sample, market, and demand definition
In the following analysis, we restrict the sample to a balanced panel and repeat our
baseline estimations. Table 7 shows that the results persist when disregarding entry and
exit observations, with the relationship being more pronounced suggesting some effect
27We can only show cross-sectional evidence, as the AppBrain data is only available for a few waves,
making a panel difficult.
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heterogeneity.
As an alternative to our fine-grained market definition, we first define markets to
be equal to the categories provided by Google of which there are close to 50. This is
comparable with industry-level studies and possibly more common. In a second step,
we restrict our attention to the 100 most popular apps in each category regarding the
number of installations, as they are more likely to be in the choice set for consumers
browsing the Play Store.28 For both of these alternative market definitions, we find in
Table 8 that the positive relationship between data collection and market concentration
as well as market share persists in the cross section and is larger in magnitude, while in
the panel the results are less conclusive and largely insignificant. However, the results for
the sample comprising the most popular apps in each category lean to those, when using
our cluster-based measures.
Finally, the results remain robust, when defining the market even more narrow by
taking only the similar apps of up to 49 provided for each app as well as when using the
quarterly change in the number of ratings instead of the stock measure as the demand
(tables not reported).
5.2.4 Exploiting exogenous variation
Before turning to the main regression analysis of the recategorization, simple graphs
shall motivate the setup and show the development of apps in the treatment and control
groups for key variables, respectively. Figure 10 shows the average number of privacy-
sensitive permissions in new categories to decrease strongly in the periods after the recat-
egorization (panel (a)) and the average market concentration of apps to fall as well (panel
(b)), in both cases especially compared to the existing categories. This leaves us with
the hypothesis that the recategorization led to a stronger competition in the respective
markets, which we exploit in the following analysis. However, the summary statistics in
Table 9 reveals distinctive differences between new and existing categories necessitating
a careful choice of a control group.
In principle, we repeat our previous estimations and include variables indicating the
recategorized apps as the treatment group and compute interactions with time dummy
variables, labelled around the time of the category change. We vary the specification,
28The results are similar, when looking at the top 500 or top 1000 apps in each category.
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control group, and sample in the following. However, all results suggest that subsequent
to the recategorization, treated apps request significantly less privacy-sensitive permis-
sions compared to the respective control group. Accordingly, Table 10 and 11 show the
results of the pooled OLS and app fixed effect estimations, respectively. As before, the
dependent variable is the number of privacy-sensitive permissions that an app requests.
The coefficients of interest are the interactions between Recat, a dummy equal to one
for apps that moved into new categories, and time dummy variables denoted by tRecat.
The column titles denote the respective sample and control group. Recategorized apps
request less privacy-sensitive user data following the shock, either instantly (Table 11) or
beginning with the second period afterwards (Table 10). This is robust to using different
control groups such as all apps (excluding game categories), existing categories having
apps that move, existing categories having no apps that move, and finally restricting to
markets without the presence of a mover in accordance with our cluster-based definition
(columns 1, 2, 3, and 5). Finally, limiting the attention to a balanced panel still gives
the main result, though with weaker significance (column 4).
In an alternative approach motivated in Subsection A.3.1, the intensity of network
effects is used as an instrument for the competitive environment of an app. Table 15
shows the main finding to be confirmed qualitatively. The results are explained in more
detail in Subsection A.3.2.
5.3 Mechanism
5.3.1 Contrasting free and paid apps
Table 12 aims at shedding light on whether the relationship is more pronounced in
markets that are dependent on data as a currency. Consequently, columns 1, 2, 5, and
6 analyze free apps, while columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 show the baseline estimations for
paid apps, thereby differentiating between our two demand definitions, respectively. The
results show that the effects are driven by free apps. This seems quite plausible, as free
apps have to use data as a means for revenue generation in the form of ads, for example.
Moreover, it is reassuring that paid apps refrain from collecting data even in concentrated
markets, suggesting that for these apps the monetary price is still the currency instead
of data.
23
5.3.2 Size and importance of markets
In a further step, we restrict the attention to markets that are economically more
relevant, where we expect the relationship to be prevalent. For this, we restrict the
sample in Table 13 to either submarkets that consist of at least ten apps throughout the
observation period (columns 1-4), or have a minimum of 100,000 total installations at
the beginning (columns 5-8). As hypothesized, the relationship is more pronounced in
markets that are larger in size as well as in terms of demand.
5.3.3 Nonlinearity of market shares
In Table 14, we refrain from taking the logarithmic transformation of market shares
and vary the functional form. Besides looking at linear market shares, we study the
possibility of a non-linear relationship by including the squared market share, which has
been studied in the context of competition and innovation (see e.g., Aghion et al., 2005;
Cohen, 2010). The results confirm a robust relationship between market concentration
and data collection, when accounting for different functional forms of the market share.
Interestingly, the coefficient for the market share is only positive and significant for the
cross section and insignificant for the panel, when including the linear term. Adding
the squared term, the linear market share becomes positive and significant in the panel
regressions as well, while the squared term is negative and significant throughout the
specifications. This suggests an inverted U-shaped form, where apps with a higher market
share request more privacy-sensitive permissions but only up to a point of reversal.
6 Conclusion
Market concentration in data-driven markets is a major concern of policy makers and
regulators. As the digital age reduces the cost of collecting information, it is argued that
user data has become the new currency of many digital goods and services. Indeed, theo-
retical research and descriptive evidence suggest that data collection (and the associated
loss of privacy) increases with a firm’s market power, similar to a price.
In this paper, we provide the first large-scale empirical evidence on the relationship
of market concentration and the collection of privacy-sensitive user data. We study the
market structure of the Google Play Store comprising more than 1.5 million apps in
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several thousand submarkets over the period from October 2015 to January 2018 on a
quarterly basis and combine this data with information on each app’s data collection
practices as well as additional information on data sharing with third parties.
We find robust evidence that apps in markets with higher concentration collect more
privacy-sensitive user data. Within such markets, apps with higher market shares collect
more data. The positive relationship is robust to using alternative measurements of key
variables, extending the analysis to data sharing, and varying the sample, market, and
demand definition. We address endogeneity concerns by instrumenting the app’s com-
petitive environment by measures of network effects and exploit a recategorization. The
main result emerges consistently across all our specifications, but the size and economic
significance of the effects vary with the specification and the focal market. The relation-
ship is more pronounced in economically relevant markets and in markets that rely on
data, but further research is needed to provide a more precise quantification of the effect.
Nevertheless, our work suffers from several limitations, which we seek to overcome
in ongoing research. We measure our effect of interest for the average app across all
markets, but additional research shall analyze markets with different oligopolistic struc-
tures separately and study the role of entry and exit more carefully. This shall also
help to further study the underlying mechanisms. In a similar vein, regressions on the
market-level, accounting for a possible lag structure, and varying the functional form of
variables approximating competition are to be revisited. Additionally, we plan to im-
prove our causal analysis by refining the control group for the recategorization and the
accompanied analyses.
These limitations notwithstanding, our research provides important empirical evi-
dence about the relationship of market concentration and data collection, thereby con-
tributing to the scientific, managerial, and policy perspective. First, it complements
previous research by studying a highly relevant market at large and employing novel
measures, as well as a series of analyses including the identification of causal effects.
Second, it sheds light on the role of data for firm success. Third, it contributes to the
recently emerged interest by competition authorities on the role of privacy for antitrust.
Our results suggest that data collection is more prevalent in concentrated markets.
This finding raises questions regarding data sharing and data portability. However, even
though our evidence of a positive relationship between market concentration and data
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collection is highly significant and robust, our estimates of its strength are sensitive to
the chosen specification. Especially, the fixed effects estimation reveals the relationship
to be rather small. According to our preferred specification, apps in highly concentrated
markets collect on average around one to three percent more data, but further research
is needed to test and validate these findings.
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A Appendix
A.1 Additional information on dataset
A.1.1 Collection of data
Figure 6: Web-scraping of the Google Play Store
Retrieve list of Google 
IDs from a registry
Add new Google IDs to
list of Google IDs 
Browse Play Store page
of each Google ID
Browse Similar Apps of 
each Google ID
Retrieve Google IDs
Notes: The figure shows the process of retrieving apps in the Google Play Store by means of
web-scraping. Starting with a registry of the most relevant apps, e.g., from AndroidRank,
new apps are identified by the similar apps provided on the Play Store page for each app.
A.1.2 Description of data
The raw data include the following app-specific information which we use to construct
our measures of competition, and developers’ data access as well as our control variables:
Competitor information:
• names and IDs of similar apps.
User data (or privacy):
• all permissions that apps are requesting (upon installation) and that apps require
to perform certain functions (in total more than 200 permissions, including, e.g.,
‘network access,’ ‘read contents of USB,’ ‘read contact data,’ ‘read browser data,’
‘read sensitive log data’),
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• additional information about these permissions (special flag by Google, considered
privacy-sensitive by researchers, etc.),
• name and type of libraries (retrieved from AppBrain).
Control variables:
• total number of installations of an app,
• number and values of quantitative ratings (from 1 to 5 stars),
• information on updates: date, textual information on what is new, and version
number,
• price (in Euro),
• existence of in-app purchases and the price range of such items in Euro,
• existence of in-app advertisements,
• app category (e.g., Racing, Personalization, Traveling, Weather, Social, Health &
Fitness, Finance, Communication, etc.),
• apps’ description (length and content) and its illustration in the Play Store (video
and screenshot availability),
• app age (retrieved from AppBrain),
• content rating (USK) and ‘may contain’ warnings,
• availability of interactive elements (e.g., ‘users interact,’ ‘digital purchases,’ etc.),
• is the app an editor’s choice (yes/no),
• Android version required for installation,
• presence of a privacy policy,
• contact information of the app (including website, e-mail, and address).
Developer-specific information:
• name of the developer,
• top developer status (yes/no),
• number of its apps,
• set of its available apps.
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A.1.3 Market definition based on clusters
Figure 7: Exemplary cluster of similar apps
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Notes: The figure shows the cluster of apps that allow users to access the
Internet through a virtual private network. A node in the network represents
an app, and an edge means that one app is the other one’s set of “similar apps.”
While all the apps in this figure belong to the same cluster or submarket in
our analysis, some apps are clearly closer in the “similar app” network than
others.
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A.2 Tables and figures
Figure 8: Share of apps with problematic permissions by category
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Figure 9: Average market concentration (HHI) by category
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Table 3: Apps in categories before and after recategorization
July 2017 October 2017
Category N % Category N %
Action 19,600 1.63 Action 20,798 1.57
Adventure 12,254 1.02 Adventure 13,223 1.00
Arcade 47,072 3.90 Arcade 48,538 3.67
Art & Designa 155 0.01
Auto & Vehiclesb 513 0.04
Beautyb 221 0.02
Board 5,610 0.47 Board 5,828 0.44
Books & Reference 55,751 4.62 Books & Reference 60,639 4.59
Business 42,917 3.56 Business 67,176 5.08
Card 6,482 0.54 Card 6,735 0.51
Casino 4,831 0.40 Casino 5,168 0.39
Casual 50,093 4.16 Casual 51,893 3.93
Comics 2,620 0.22 Comics 2,746 0.21
Communication 27,733 2.30 Communication 29,060 2.20
Datingc 193 0.01
Education 102,726 8.52 Education 107,633 8.14
Educational 17,249 1.43 Educational 18,031 1.36
Entertainmentd 85,933 7.13 Entertainment 91,398 6.92
Eventsd 127 0.01
Finance 27,775 2.30 Finance 28,686 2.17
Food & Drinkb 1,365 0.10
Health & Fitness 36,297 3.01 Health & Fitness 39,102 2.96
House & Homeb 223 0.02
Libraries & Demo 3,140 0.26 Libraries & Demo 3,132 0.24
Lifestyleb 87,984 7.30 Lifestyle 92,376 6.99
Maps & Navigation 20,981 1.59
Media & Video 14,665 1.22
Medical 14,539 1.21 Medical 17,682 1.34
Music 1,679 0.14 Music 1,738 0.13
Music & Audio 52,600 4.36 Music & Audio 55,508 4.20
News & Magazines 34,014 2.82 News & Magazines 35,430 2.68
Parentingb 177 0.01
Personalization 83,068 6.89 Personalization 87,264 6.60
Photography 15,433 1.28 Photography 24,592 1.86
Productivitya 38,462 3.19 Productivity 40,155 3.04
Puzzle 46,925 3.89 Puzzle 52,894 4.00
Racing 8,433 0.70 Racing 10,535 0.80
Role Playing 1,846 0.15 Role Playing 4,323 0.33
Shopping 23,411 1.94 Shopping 25,497 1.93
Simulation 4,502 0.37 Simulation 14,913 1.13
Socialc 26,795 2.22 Social 27,772 2.10
Sports 28,541 2.37 Sports 34,259 2.59
Strategy 4,929 0.41 Strategy 5,383 0.41
Tools 80,891 6.71 Tools 82,278 6.23
Transportation 20,559 1.71
Travel & Local 49,578 4.11 Travel & Local 50,840 3.85
Trivia 8,150 0.68 Trivia 8,737 0.66
Video Players & Editors 14,996 1.13
Weather 5,932 0.49 Weather 6,024 0.46
Word 4,411 0.37 Word 4,577 0.35
Total 1,205,430 100.00 Total 1,321,514 100.00
Notes: New categories are highlighted in bold. a, b, c, and d denote the categories in which
apps were before the change (according to Google). In the regressions, these categories are
called pre-move categories and are denoted by OLD.
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Table 4: Alternative data collection measures
DDataCollection #Category−SpecificDataCollection
CS1 CS2 Panel1 Panel2 CS1 CS2 Panel1 Panel2
HHI 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.077*** 0.072*** 0.002 0.002***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. Market Share 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log. Ratings -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DPaid -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.176*** -0.176*** -0.030*** -0.030***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
#CleanPerms. 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.128*** 0.128***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DInAppProduct 0.036*** 0.036*** -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.113*** -0.113***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Avg. Rating -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Log. Length Description -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
DIncludesAds -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.027*** -0.027***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Content Rating 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.017*** 0.017*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DPrivacyProfile 0.208*** 0.208*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.156*** 0.156*** -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
#AppsbyDeveloper -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
App Age 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (.) (.) (0.000) (0.000) (.) (.)
Constant 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.247*** 0.247*** -0.014 -0.014 -0.239*** -0.239***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015)
Category Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Wave No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Mean #DataCollection 0.520 0.520 0.534 0.534 0.402 0.402 0.409 0.409
Observations 1,336,625 1,336,625 11,477,730 11,477,730 1,336,625 1,336,625 11,477,730 11,477,730
Num. of Groups 1,705,215 1,705,215 1,705,215 1,705,215
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.36 0.14 0.14 0.29 0.29 0.16 0.16
Notes: The table shows the baseline estimations, when using alternative measures of data collection. The dependent vari-
able in columns 1-4 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if an app collects any privacy-sensitive permissions
(DDataCollection), and in columns 5-8, we use context-specific criteria based on the app categories to determine which permis-
sions are privacy-sensitive and not necessarily functional (Category−SpecificDataCollection). The coefficients of interest are
HHI and Log. Market Share. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Alternative competition measures
#DataCollection
CS1 Panel1 CS1 Panel1 CS1 Panel1
HHI 0.3-0.6 0.037*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.001)
HHI 0.6-1 0.035*** 0.001
(0.007) (0.001)
#NumberofCompetitors/100 0.001*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Market Share of Top 4 0.053*** 0.004***
(0.005) (0.001)
Log. Market Share 0.013*** 0.001*** 0.017*** -0.000 0.012*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log. Ratings -0.079*** -0.019*** -0.082*** -0.017*** -0.078*** -0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DPaid -0.330*** 0.028*** -0.329*** 0.028*** -0.330*** 0.027***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009)
#CleanPerms. 0.312*** 0.267*** 0.312*** 0.266*** 0.311*** 0.266***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
DInAppProduct -0.118*** -0.025*** -0.119*** -0.023*** -0.117*** -0.026***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Avg. Rating -0.000 -0.008*** -0.001 -0.008*** -0.000 -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. Length Description -0.035*** -0.017*** -0.035*** -0.017*** -0.035*** -0.017***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
DIncludesAds -0.321*** -0.046*** -0.322*** -0.045*** -0.324*** -0.047***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Content Rating 0.013*** -0.006*** 0.014*** -0.006*** 0.013*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DPrivacyProfile 0.373*** -0.037*** 0.372*** -0.035*** 0.376*** -0.036***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
#AppsbyDeveloper -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
App Age 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (.) (0.000) (.) (0.000) (.)
Constant -0.194*** 0.264*** -0.146*** 0.265*** -0.216*** 0.263***
(0.014) (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020)
Wave No Yes No Yes No Yes
Category Yes No Yes No Yes No
Mean #DataCollection 1.325 1.356 1.325 1.356 1.321 1.351
Observations 1,336,625 11,477,730 1,336,625 11,477,730 1,315,680 11,287,307
Num. of Groups 1,705,215 1,705,215 1,683,153
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.28 0.52 0.28 0.52 0.28
Notes: The table shows the baseline estimations, when using alternative measures of competition. The dependent variable in
these specifications is the number of privacy-sensitive permissions that an app collects # DataCollection. The coefficients of
interest that quantify market concentration are significantly concentrated (HHI = 0.3-0.6 ) and highly concentrated (HHI =
0.6-1.0 ) markets (in columns 1-2), the number of competitors in the market (#NumberofCompetitors in hundreds in columns
3-4) and the Market Share of Top 4. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , ***
p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Explaining data sharing
DIntrusiveLibrary
CS1 CS2 CS1 CS2
HHI 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log. Market Share 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Log. Ratings 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DPaid -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.118***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
#CleanPerms. 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DInAppProduct 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Avg. Rating 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. Length Description 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DIncludesAds 0.500*** 0.500*** 0.501*** 0.501***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Content Rating -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DPrivacyProfile 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
#AppsbyDeveloper -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
App Age -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.321*** 0.321*** 0.339*** 0.340***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean DIntrusiveLibrary 0.671 0.671 0.671 0.671
Observations 333,613 333,613 333,613 333,613
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
Notes: The table analyzes the relationship between competition and data sharing as measured by the existence of intrusive
software libraries within apps. The table shows cross-sectional estimates and the dependent variable is a dummy variable, which
is equal to one if an app uses at least one intrusive software library (DIntrusiveLibrary). The coefficients of interest are HHI
and Log. Market Share. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Baseline estimations (with balanced panel)
#DataCollection
CS1 CS2 Panel1 Panel2 CS1 CS2 Panel1 Panel2
HHI 0.169*** 0.154*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002)
Log. Market Share 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Log. Ratings -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DPaid -0.300*** -0.300*** 0.061*** 0.061*** -0.296*** -0.296*** 0.061*** 0.061***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.017)
#CleanPerms. 0.324*** 0.324*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.324*** 0.324*** 0.261*** 0.261***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
DInAppProduct -0.130*** -0.130*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.044*** -0.044***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
Avg. Rating 0.001 0.001 -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. Length Description -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.026*** -0.026***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
DIncludesAds -0.292*** -0.292*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.289*** -0.289*** -0.055*** -0.055***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Content Rating 0.020*** 0.020*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.019*** 0.019*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
DPrivacyProfile 0.317*** 0.317*** -0.043*** -0.043*** 0.318*** 0.318*** -0.043*** -0.043***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
#AppsbyDeveloper -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
App Age 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (.) (.) (0.000) (0.000) (.) (.)
Constant -0.422*** -0.422*** 0.382*** 0.382*** -0.258*** -0.259*** 0.409*** 0.407***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.029) (0.029) (0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.030)
Category Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Wave No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Mean #DataCollection 1.428 1.428 1.448 1.448 1.428 1.428 1.448 1.448
Observations 449,093 449,093 4,245,348 4,245,348 449,093 449,093 4,245,348 4,245,348
Num. of Groups 573,817 573,817 573,817 573,817
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.52 0.28 0.28 0.52 0.52 0.28 0.28
Notes: The table shows the baseline estimations, when restricting to a balanced panel. Cross-sectional and panel fixed effects
regressions are given, while the dependent variable is the number of privacy-sensitive permissions that an app collects #
DataCollection. The coefficients of interest are HHI and Log. Market Share. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in
parentheses: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Categories defining the market
Total Category Top 100 of Category
CS1 CS2 Panel1 Panel2 CS1 CS2 Panel1 Panel2
HHI 3.152*** 2.469*** -0.004 -0.009*** 2.049*** 1.750*** 0.002 -0.000
(0.040) (0.030) (0.003) (0.003) (0.422) (0.360) (0.045) (0.041)
Log. Market Share 0.088*** 0.084*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.078*** 0.074*** -0.003 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.021) (0.008) (0.008)
Log. Ratings -0.166*** -0.167*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.048*** -0.049*** 0.015 0.015
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) (0.016) (0.026) (0.026)
DPaid -0.428*** -0.428*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.167 0.169 0.065 0.064
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.373) (0.373) (0.055) (0.055)
#CleanPerms. 0.319*** 0.319*** 0.267*** 0.267*** 0.286*** 0.286*** 0.252*** 0.252***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.023) (0.023) (0.010) (0.010)
DInAppProduct -0.162*** -0.159*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.259*** -0.260*** 0.102** 0.102**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051)
Avg. Rating -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.088 -0.087 -0.111 -0.112
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.054) (0.054) (0.089) (0.089)
Log. Length Description -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 0.016 0.016 0.022 0.022
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.034) (0.034) (0.028) (0.028)
DIncludesAds -0.404*** -0.402*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.622*** -0.623*** -0.088*** -0.088***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.062) (0.062) (0.017) (0.017)
Content Rating 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005 -0.006 0.028 0.028
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017)
DPrivacyProfile 0.382*** 0.382*** -0.037*** -0.037*** 0.536*** 0.536*** 0.015 0.015
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.079) (0.079) (0.018) (0.018)
#AppsbyDeveloper -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
App Age 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (.) (.) (0.000) (0.000) (.) (.)
Constant 1.265*** 1.259*** 0.174*** 0.176*** 0.569 0.556 0.143 0.144
(0.028) (0.028) (0.021) (0.021) (0.387) (0.384) (0.446) (0.445)
Wave No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Mean #DataCollection 1.325 1.325 1.356 1.356 2.048 2.048 2.066 2.066
Observations 1,336,625 1,336,625 11,477,730 11,477,730 4,800 4,800 40,509 40,509
Num. of Groups 1,705,215 1,705,215 15,306 15,306
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.51 0.28 0.28 0.61 0.61 0.27 0.27
Notes: The table analyzes the relationship between market concentration and data collection with the market being defined by
the category or by the 100 most popular apps in the category. Cross-sectional and panel fixed effects regressions are given, while
the dependent variable is the number of privacy-sensitive permissions that an app collects # DataCollection. The coefficients
of interest are HHI and Log. Market Share. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 ,
*** p < 0.01.
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Figure 10: Development of new and existing categories
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Notes: Based on the whole observation period, the figures show the development of key vari-
ables around the recategorization comparing new and existing categories: Panel (a) shows
the development for the number of problematic permissions requested on average, while
panel (b) shows the average HHI. In both cases, the value at the time of recategorization is
set as a benchmark.
Table 9: Summary statistics comparing new and existing categories
Existing Categories (Excluding Games) New Categories
Mean P50 Min Max Count Mean P50 Min Max Count
DDataCollection 0.58 1.00 0 1 1,008,325 0.69 1.00 0 1 5,639
#DataCollection 1.57 1.00 0 15 1,008,325 2.01 2.00 0 12 5,639
HHI 0.12 0.06 0 1 1,008,325 0.24 0.15 0 1 5,639
HHI 0.13 0.07 0 1 1,008,325 0.26 0.16 0 1 5,639
Market Share 0.02 0.00 0 1 1,008,325 0.07 0.00 0 1 5,639
Market Share 0.02 0.00 0 1 1,008,325 0.07 0.00 0 1 5,639
DPaid 0.08 0.00 0 1 1,008,325 0.04 0.00 0 1 5,639
#CleanPerms. 4.72 4.00 0 169 1,008,325 5.90 6.00 0 27 5,639
DInAppProduct 0.06 0.00 0 1 1,008,325 0.10 0.00 0 1 5,639
Avg. Rating 4.08 4.20 1 5 1,008,325 4.20 4.30 1 5 5,639
Length Description 1,065.59 740.00 1 11,588 1,008,325 1,457.37 1,021.00 3 11,034 5,639
Content Rating 8.25 8.00 3 10 1,008,325 7.69 8.00 3 10 5,639
DPrivacyProfile 0.18 0.00 0 1 1,008,325 0.41 0.00 0 1 5,639
#AppsbyDeveloper 71.51 8.00 1 2,490 1,008,325 91.84 7.00 1 1,270 5,639
App Age 1,229.36 1,119.00 -15 3,334 1,008,325 1,037.66 930.00 43 2,925 5,639
Notes: The table compares summary statistics between new and existing categories at the time of recategorization, the former
comprising all apps that chose to switch. The variable DIncludesAds is excluded as back then it was not mandatory to indicate,
whether ads are included.
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Table 10: Recategorization (pooled OLS)
#DataCollection
ALL OLD NOT OLD-BP OLD-CL
HHI 0.041*** 0.083*** 0.020*** 0.112*** 0.014**
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.007)
Log. Market Share 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.019***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Recat x tRecat-2 0.034 0.050* 0.031 0.080* 0.057**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.044) (0.026)
Recat x tRecat-1 -0.012 -0.012 -0.016 -0.005 -0.005
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.038) (0.025)
Recat x tRecat -0.015 -0.041** -0.005 -0.052 -0.029
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.035) (0.020)
Recat x tRecat+1 -0.015 -0.036** -0.007 -0.026 -0.028
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.035) (0.018)
Recat x tRecat+2 -0.041*** -0.076*** -0.031** -0.082** -0.075***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.036) (0.016)
Recat x tRecat+3 -0.040*** -0.057*** -0.037** -0.106*** -0.056***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.039) (0.016)
Recat x tRecat+4 -0.033** -0.049*** -0.026* -0.073** -0.053***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.037) (0.016)
Recat -0.062*** -0.014 -0.096*** -0.049 -0.011
(0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.033) (0.018)
tRecat-2 -0.023*** -0.038*** -0.017*** -0.048*** -0.034***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005)
tRecat-1 -0.020*** -0.036*** -0.012*** -0.042*** -0.032***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
tRecat -0.073*** -0.058*** -0.090*** -0.049*** -0.068***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006)
tRecat+1 -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.073*** -0.051*** -0.065***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
tRecat+2 0.018*** 0.035*** 0.012*** 0.037*** 0.026***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
tRecat+3 0.007*** 0.025*** -0.000 0.035*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
tRecat+4 0.004** 0.028*** -0.004** 0.034*** 0.018***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
Log. Ratings -0.086*** -0.112*** -0.076*** -0.113*** -0.117***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
DPaid -0.267*** -0.342*** -0.242*** -0.346*** -0.324***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005)
#CleanPerms. 0.328*** 0.355*** 0.319*** 0.355*** 0.352***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
DInAppProduct -0.146*** -0.079*** -0.161*** -0.076*** -0.139***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005)
Avg. Rating 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.003*** 0.019*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Log. Length Description -0.025*** -0.006*** -0.031*** -0.009*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
DIncludesAds -0.346*** -0.386*** -0.325*** -0.320*** -0.354***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003)
Content Rating 0.014*** 0.006*** 0.021*** 0.006*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DPrivacyProfile 0.288*** 0.341*** 0.267*** 0.331*** 0.380***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004)
#AppsbyDeveloper 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
App Age 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.193 1.211*** 0.247 -1.116*** 1.205***
(0.229) (0.025) (0.229) (0.059) (0.026)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean #DataCollection 1.524 1.645 1.484 1.770 1.612
Observations 8,886,685 2,274,152 6,683,836 880,884 1,514,417
Num. of Groups
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.50 0.53 0.48 0.50
Notes: The table shows pooled OLS regressions, while the dependent variable is the number of privacy-sensitive permissions
that an app requests # DataCollection. The coefficients of interest are the interactions between Recat, a dummy equal to one
for apps that moved into new categories, and time dummies denoted by tRecat. Column titles denote the control group and
sample (ALL = all apps, OLD = pre-move categories, NOT = non-move categories, BP = balanced panel, CL = cluster with
movers omitted). Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01.
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Table 11: Recategorization (app fixed effects)
#DataCollection
ALL OLD NOT OLD-BP OLD-CL
HHI 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.033*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Log. Market Share 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Recat x tRecat-2 0.044*** 0.055*** 0.045*** 0.121*** 0.057***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.022) (0.011)
Recat x tRecat-1 -0.007 -0.001 -0.006 0.019 0.000
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.009)
Recat x tRecat -0.021*** -0.018** -0.022*** -0.021 -0.016**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008)
Recat x tRecat+1 -0.022*** -0.029*** -0.022*** -0.065*** -0.028***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007)
Recat x tRecat+2 -0.014** -0.019*** -0.012** -0.020 -0.018***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006)
Recat x tRecat+3 -0.009* -0.014*** -0.008* -0.027** -0.013**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005)
Recat x tRecat+4 -0.020*** -0.031*** -0.018*** -0.100*** -0.030***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.013) (0.005)
tRecat-2 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.010***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
tRecat-1 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.010***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
tRecat 0.025*** 0.039*** 0.018*** 0.037*** 0.050***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009)
tRecat+1 -0.001 0.012*** -0.006*** 0.016*** 0.017***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
tRecat+2 -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.001 -0.004***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
tRecat+3 -0.004*** 0.000 -0.006*** 0.005*** -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
tRecat+4 -0.010*** -0.002** -0.013*** -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. Ratings -0.028*** -0.033*** -0.026*** -0.038*** -0.029***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
DPaid 0.043*** 0.006 0.053*** -0.035 0.001
(0.011) (0.021) (0.012) (0.040) (0.024)
#CleanPerms. 0.271*** 0.272*** 0.271*** 0.259*** 0.273***
(0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.015) (0.010)
DInAppProduct -0.086*** 0.014 -0.118*** -0.032 -0.070***
(0.008) (0.019) (0.009) (0.031) (0.023)
Avg. Rating -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.003*** -0.012*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Log. Length Description -0.017*** -0.027*** -0.013*** -0.050*** -0.030***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.008)
DIncludesAds -0.063*** -0.043*** -0.070*** -0.045*** -0.040***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Content Rating -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.014***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
DPrivacyProfile -0.036*** -0.044*** -0.034*** -0.051*** -0.042***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
#AppsbyDeveloper 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.435** 0.586*** 0.027 0.971*** 0.615***
(0.190) (0.065) (0.343) (0.124) (0.083)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean #DataCollection 1.524 1.645 1.484 1.770 1.612
Observations 8,886,685 2,274,152 6,683,836 880,884 1,514,417
Num. of Groups 1,312,919 341,019 991,495 119,012 228,270
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.26 0.29 0.25 0.26
Notes: The table shows panel regressions with app fixed effects, while the dependent variable is the number of privacy-sensitive
permissions that an app requests # DataCollection. The coefficients of interest are the interactions between Recat, a dummy
equal to one for apps that moved into new categories, and time dummies denoted by tRecat. Column titles denote the control
group and sample (ALL = all apps, OLD = pre-move categories, NOT = non-move categories, BP = balanced panel, CL =
cluster with movers omitted). Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01.
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Table 12: Contrasting free and paid apps
Free Paid Free Paid
CS1 Panel1 CS1 Panel1 CS2 Panel2 CS2 Panel2
HHI 0.089*** 0.009*** 0.020 0.005* 0.088*** 0.008*** 0.030 0.005
(0.007) (0.001) (0.024) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.022) (0.003)
Log. Market Share 0.012*** 0.002*** 0.013*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.002*** 0.013*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Log. Ratings -0.079*** -0.019*** -0.049*** -0.020*** -0.079*** -0.019*** -0.049*** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
#CleanPerms. 0.317*** 0.269*** 0.224*** 0.179*** 0.317*** 0.269*** 0.224*** 0.179***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.018) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.018)
DInAppProduct -0.125*** -0.033*** 0.018 0.227*** -0.125*** -0.033*** 0.018 0.227***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.019) (0.033) (0.004) (0.006) (0.019) (0.033)
Avg. Rating 0.002 -0.008*** -0.042*** -0.001 0.002 -0.008*** -0.042*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Log. Length Description -0.031*** -0.018*** -0.056*** -0.006 -0.031*** -0.018*** -0.056*** -0.006
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.011)
DIncludesAds -0.322*** -0.046*** 0.106*** 0.003 -0.322*** -0.046*** 0.106*** 0.003
(0.003) (0.001) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.015) (0.003)
Content Rating 0.008*** -0.006*** 0.051*** -0.002 0.008*** -0.006*** 0.051*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
DPrivacyProfile 0.377*** -0.037*** 0.261*** -0.031*** 0.377*** -0.037*** 0.261*** -0.031***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.009) (0.004)
#AppsbyDeveloper -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
App Age 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (.) (0.000) (.) (0.000) (.) (0.000) (.)
Constant -0.260*** 0.281*** -0.002 0.192** -0.259*** 0.280*** -0.008 0.191**
(0.015) (0.020) (0.049) (0.076) (0.015) (0.020) (0.048) (0.076)
Wave No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Category Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Mean #DataCollection 1.370 1.405 0.688 0.695 1.370 1.405 0.688 0.695
Observations 1,249,591 10,688,842 87,034 788,888 1,249,591 10,688,842 87,034 788,888
Num. of Groups 1,597,521 111,463 1,597,521 111,463
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.28 0.42 0.19 0.53 0.28 0.42 0.19
Notes: The table shows the baseline estimations for different subgroups of apps. Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 analyze free apps,
while columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 show the relationship for paid apps. It shows only panel regressions and the dependent variable
is the number of privacy-sensitive permissions that an app collects # DataCollection. The coefficients of interest are HHI and
Log. Market Share. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01.
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Table 13: Restricting to large and important markets
More than 10 Apps More than 100,000 Installations
CS1 CS2 Panel1 Panel2 CS1 CS2 Panel1 Panel2
HHI 0.143*** 0.132*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.085*** 0.082*** 0.014*** 0.013***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001)
Log. Market Share 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Log. Ratings -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.021*** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DPaid -0.333*** -0.333*** 0.047*** 0.047*** -0.338*** -0.338*** 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010)
#CleanPerms. 0.304*** 0.304*** 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.302*** 0.302*** 0.262*** 0.262***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
DInAppProduct -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.027*** -0.027***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Avg. Rating 0.003 0.003 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. Length Description -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.006* -0.006* -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.018*** -0.018***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
DIncludesAds -0.370*** -0.370*** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.360*** -0.360*** -0.050*** -0.050***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Content Rating 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DPrivacyProfile 0.387*** 0.387*** -0.039*** -0.039*** 0.399*** 0.399*** -0.038*** -0.038***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
#AppsbyDeveloper -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
App Age 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (.) (.) (0.000) (0.000) (.) (.)
Constant 0.030 0.030 0.271*** 0.268*** -0.122*** -0.120*** 0.277*** 0.274***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021)
Category Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Wave No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Mean #DataCollection 1.287 1.287 1.314 1.314 1.263 1.263 1.291 1.291
Observations 826,982 826,982 7,047,188 7,047,188 1,129,623 1,129,623 9,651,078 9,651,078
Num. of Groups 1,037,607 1,037,607 1,433,422 1,433,422
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.53 0.26 0.26 0.52 0.52 0.27 0.27
Notes: The table shows the baseline estimations, when restricting to specific markets. Columns 1-4 include markets that consist
of at least ten apps throughout the observation period, while columns 5-8 only consider those that have a minimum of 100,000
total installations at the beginning. Cross-sectional and panel regressions are given, while the dependent variable is the number
of privacy-sensitive permissions that an app collects # DataCollection. The coefficients of interest are HHI and Log. Market
Share. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01.
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Table 14: Varying the functional form of market shares
#DataCollection
CS1 CS2 Panel1 Panel2 CS1 CS2 Panel1 Panel2
HHI 0.109*** 0.098*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.109*** 0.100*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
Market Share 0.158*** 0.162*** 0.007 0.006 0.549*** 0.551*** 0.033*** 0.030**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.035) (0.035) (0.012) (0.012)
Market Share Squared -0.581*** -0.568*** -0.034** -0.031**
(0.049) (0.048) (0.015) (0.014)
Log. Ratings -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.018*** -0.018***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DPaid -0.334*** -0.334*** 0.028*** 0.028*** -0.333*** -0.333*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009)
#CleanPerms. 0.312*** 0.312*** 0.267*** 0.267*** 0.312*** 0.312*** 0.267*** 0.267***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
DInAppProduct -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.025*** -0.025***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Avg. Rating 0.001 0.001 -0.008*** -0.008*** 0.001 0.001 -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. Length Description -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
DIncludesAds -0.324*** -0.324*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.046*** -0.046***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Content Rating 0.015*** 0.015*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.014*** 0.014*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DPrivacyProfile 0.372*** 0.372*** -0.037*** -0.037*** 0.372*** 0.372*** -0.037*** -0.037***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
#AppsbyDeveloper -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
App Age 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (.) (.) (0.000) (0.000) (.) (.)
Constant -0.373*** -0.373*** 0.250*** 0.250*** -0.373*** -0.372*** 0.250*** 0.250***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020)
Category Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Wave No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Mean #DataCollection 1.325 1.325 1.356 1.356 1.325 1.325 1.356 1.356
Observations 1,336,625 1,336,625 1,1477,730 11,477,730 1,336,625 1,336,625 11,477,730 11,477,730
Num. of Groups 1,705,215 1,705,215 1,705,215 1,705,215
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.52 0.28 0.28 0.52 0.52 0.28 0.28
Notes: The table shows the baseline estimations, when varying the functional form of markets. Columns 1-4 include the linear
market share, while columns 5-8 additionally control for the squared market share. Cross-sectional and panel regressions are
given, while the dependent variable is the number of privacy-sensitive permissions that an app collects # DataCollection.
The coefficients of interest are HHI, Market Share and Market Share Squared. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in
parentheses: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01.
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A.3 Exogenous variation in intensity of network effects
A.3.1 Instrumental variables based on network effects
To identify the effect of market power on data collection causally, we exploit variation
in the intensity of a submarket’s network effects (NE). Some services that apps provide
can reach their full service quality independently of whether others use the same app or
not (e.g., a wallpaper). These apps have no network effects. Other apps, like messengers
or dating apps, are only useful if a user’s relevant peers also use the same app. Such
apps have very strong network effects. We can also find apps with intermediate network
effects. These are apps that can provide basic functionality and utility independent of
who else uses it, but have additional features that require the app’s adoption by fellow
users. An example could be a running app that lets you share some personal statistics
with one’s peers who also use the same app.
We employ several ways to measure the extent to which network effects are present in
the respective market. The first approach exploits app characteristics to infer the extent
through a badge on the app’s Google Play Store page highlighting that users interact
with others within the app. Second, we look at the content of the app’s description,
whether keywords appear that suggest the need for other users and thus the presence of
network effects such as ‘multiplayer,’ ‘friends,’ and ‘share.’ Third, we randomly present
users information from the Play Store on apps from each category and ask, whether it is
beneficial if a certain app is also used by others or their friends.29
In this identification approach we exploit the fact that the strength of a submarket’s
network effects depends heavily on the nature of the service that is being provided, but
not on the strategy of the players in the market. The strength of a service’s network
effects thus ‘programs’ the submarket’s concentration in equilibrium and is also a good
predictor of the observed market concentration, as it converges to the equilibrium state.
While this phenomenon creates a research opportunity in and of itself, the strength of
the network effects can also serve as a instrumental variable that exogenously affects
concentration.
29So far, this has been only done with a few research assistants, but we plan to enlarge the sample by
asking individuals at Amazon Mechanical Turk.
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A.3.2 Instrumental variable strategy
In Table 15, we provide our estimates based on applying an instrumental variable
estimation, for which we use variation in a product’s exogenous property of network
effects. For this, we use (1) the presence of users’ interaction (DUsersInteract), (2) the
assessment, whether other users are necessary when using the app on a scale from 0 to
1 (Users’ NE Assessment) and (3) the presence of keywords suggesting network effects
(DNEKeywords). These three measures shall instrument the HHI of the app’s market
and its market share. Table 15 shows the results of the IV in the cross section and
accordingly the first stages for both endogenous regressors as the dependent variable
and our primary demand measure based on the number of ratings (columns 1 and 2).
The results are qualitatively similar for our second demand measure. The coefficients of
the instruments show that the presence of network effects is positively and significantly
correlated with the market concentration an app is in (for all the three measures), whereas
for the market share this positive relationship applies to the presence of user interaction
and the assessment that other users are necessary for the app’s use. Values for the F-
Test of well above 10 suggest the instruments to be relevant. Using the instrumented HHI
and market share, we run the same specification as before with the number of privacy-
sensitive permissions as the dependent variable (column 3). The results show the sign
and significance for the coefficients of interest HHI and Log. Market Share to remain
the same. However, the coefficients are distinctively larger than in the baseline.
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Table 15: Network effects as instrumental variables
Log. Market Share HHI #DataCollection
CS1 CS1 CS1
DUsersInteract 0.297*** 0.003***
(0.012) (0.001)
Users’ NE Assessment 1.202*** 0.080***
(0.021) (0.001)
DNEKeywords -0.133*** 0.003***
(0.007) (0.000)
HHI 4.856***
(0.307)
Log. Market Share 0.153***
(0.019)
Log. Ratings 0.713*** -0.003*** -0.178***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.014)
DPaid -0.798*** -0.026*** -0.188***
(0.014) (0.001) (0.011)
#CleanPerms. 0.033*** 0.001*** 0.313***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
DInAppProduct -0.465*** 0.003*** -0.132***
(0.011) (0.001) (0.011)
Avg. Rating 0.108*** -0.002*** -0.015***
(0.004) (0.000) (0.004)
Log. Length Description -0.041*** -0.008*** 0.021***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003)
DIncludesAds -0.692*** -0.015*** -0.241***
(0.007) (0.000) (0.010)
Content Rating 0.185*** -0.000 -0.008**
(0.004) (0.000) (0.004)
DPrivacyProfile -0.022*** -0.003*** 0.399***
(0.007) (0.000) (0.005)
#AppsbyDeveloper -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
App Age 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -11.137*** 0.215*** 0.303
(0.036) (0.002) (0.270)
Mean #DataCollection 1.324
Observations 783,807 783,807 783,807
F-Test 1st Stage 1,554.75
Centered R2 0.20
Notes: In this table, we provide instrumental variable estimations. We use three instruments for the HHI and the market
share: (1) the presence of users’ interaction (DUsersInteract), (2) the assessment, whether other users are necessary when
using the app on a scale from 0 to 1 (Users’ NE Assessment), and (3) the presence of keywords suggesting network effects
(DNEKeywords). In columns 1 and 2, we show the first stages for both endogenous regressors as the dependent variable and
our first demand measure. Column 3 contains the second stage results again with the number of privacy-sensitive permissions
as the dependent variable. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01.
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